I_IISCOUNT i-ate changes invariably send newspaper reporters to the phone to call their favorite econonnst to ask the inevitable question What will this (11) to market interest rates? The impact of cbscount rate changes on market interest rates appal'-entlv is the source of much pnhl ic confusion and misunderstanding. This confusion arises from a variety of flictorsFirst, the discount rate is an administered rate set liv the Federal Reserve. Second, high interest rates often occur when the discount rate is high, while low interest rates often occur when the discount rate is low. Finally, discount rate changes often are associated with changes in other interest rates in the same direction. These factors have led to a misunderstanding about the pre-eminence of the discount rate in credit markets.
:31 . 1980, dl clepos ito iv inst tn tic,'is ivill Ii ave the s Ills C' rest'I've hetween the discount rate and market interest rate-s can he illustrated using a sirnple, static model of interest rates called the loutm (ill/C fit tids t heorti. According to the loanahie funds theory, interest rates are determined by' the intersection of the demand fhr and supply of credit, as illustrated in figure 1. The demand for credit consists of inx-estsnent demand, government demand (deficits) and changes in the demand for money.
0 The supply of credit is coinposed of public and private savings and changes in the supply of money, Changes in the discount rate affect market interest rates only' to the extent that they alter the demand for or the supply of credit.
it).~f't(dA and th.es )..i4V3) of Credit
Changes in the discount rate directly affect the supply of credit through their impact on the money' supply. To i lustrate this, consider the simple model of the m 01) ey supply guen by 
B.
The supply o inomin al money (Ms) is determined hy' the product ol the monetary base (13) and the money' multiplier (mu). The monetary base consists of the total reserves of depository' institutions pius currencv held by' the norihank public. The money' multiplier summarizes the effect of all other factors 01) the money supply and, for the purpose of our analysis, is hase, therefore, can he written as the sum of BR, NBR and curremmc~held by' the nonhank ptmhlic (C).
Thus. equatiomi 1 can he rewritten as:
Chamiges in the discount rate affect market interest rates through their impact om borrowing frons the Federal Reserye. For example, an inc'reuse in the discount rate will reduce the level of borrowing, ceteris parihus, reducing both the monetary base and the money supply. As a result, the supply-ofcredit schedule in figure 1 will shift to the left and market interest rates will rise. Reducing the discount rate will have the opposite effect.
fl5S•f Jl,et(.' j 4 nfleSt,ye5))~5j
Dipositoru /~n'cs;fsef;s~~~p tt'vr~r'es)err ' [lie crucial link between the discount rate and market interest rates is the connection between the (liscount rate and borrowing from the Federal Reserve. When the discount mechanism originally' was formulated, it was assumed that banks wonld he reluctant to he in debt to the Federal Reserve and would endeavor to repay' their indebtedness as soon as possible." it was thought that the Federal Reserve could control the level of bank borrowing by reinforcing banks reluctance to borrow, through the administratiomi of the discount window, and by' alterIt is somnc,tiinc-s a rgned that the mooIcy snpplv is positive Iv re-I ateol to in tere' st mates cliit, to cliin ige i in ti ,e pul iiic's desire to hold various assets if, rc-sponse to, interest rate changes. For an analysis of the monetary hase approach to the uloimey snppiv process, see Jerry L, Jordan, -'El ernents of tIme NI oney Stoick Determination,'' tIns Rel:ielc (Oetohcr 1969), pp. 10-19. 51 ,Vinfi dci RicHer noted that 'the reluctance of mist-mhc r hanks to ho i-row is is cit hasted so! ely tipo n the pisi I, isoph v ofrest, rvc' ho ks, I 'owever, in cIeec', that pl nb soph v me rId v c's!)roesstes the desi me oft!Ic great IOOt on ty of the meinhe r banks time' mu sc-i yes to nc nmain n,t oft1c-ht ,,, intl a feeling on the i r pail tbntt 1)1) rrov'i ng for profit is ni so,and, , , -Lou g hef tire' time e stal ifisis nmc'nt of' t lie rest,rye vstem, it Sn) 5 one of' tIit, fnncl ammic-il tal trad iti oils of soul) dl hami kin g practicc' in tim is cmiii istv, ti itt borrowing (i.e., borrowing that occurs even if the discount rate is not the least costly alternative), 9 Given equations 2 and 3, the connection between the discount rate and market interest rates is apparent. Increases in the discount rate reduce the least-cost spread, which reduces borrowing and thus the monetary base. As a result, the supply of credit schedule shifts to the left and market interest rates rise until the least-cost spread is restored. Thus, increasing the discount rate will, ceteris panbus, cause market rates to increase.
The extent of the increase in the market interest rate is determined by the sensitivity of borrowing to the least-cost spread (aj) and by the interest sensitivity of the demand for credit. The more borrowing is interest-sensitive to the least-cost spread (i.e., the larger ai), the greater will be the shift in the supply of credit for any change in the discount rate. The larger the shift in the supply of credit, the greater the change in the market interest rate, for any given credit demand curve. Also, the less interest-sensitive the demand for credit (i.e-, the steeper the demand curve), the greater the change in the market interest rate for any given shift in the supply schedule resulting from a change in the discount rate.
The Di$count Rate, interest Rates and Monetary Policy
Unfortunately, the above analysis is overly simple in that it ignores the role of monetary policy in influencing the link between the discount rate and market interest rates. Specifically, the relationship between the discount rate and market interest rates depends on other monetary policy actions and, in particular, on the operating procedure ofthe Federal Reserve. For example, ifthe Federal Reserve were to pursue a policy ofcontrolling the level of interest rates, changes in the discount rate would have no independent impact on market rates. The effect of a discount rate change on market rates could be significant when the Federal Reserve targets on nonborrowed reserves as it currently does, In this instance, changes in the discount rate alter aggregate borrowing, the monetary base and the money supply as before. The movement in the base would not necessarily be offset through open market operations. As long as nonborrowed reserves are on path, the Federal Reserve might choose not to offset changes in borrowings associated with changes in the discount rate.~Under the present system of lagged reserve accounting (LIlA), however, the effect ofa discount rate change on aggregate borrowing, the monetary base and the money supply will be much smaller.
The Role of Lagged Reserve Accounting
The present system of lagged reserve accounting, which was introduced in September 1968, has made depository institutions' demand for reserves less responsive to interest rate changes. 12 Thus, any change in the supply of reserves, either through changes in NBR on the discount rate, produces a larger change in the rates on reserve adjustment assets, such as federal funds and Treasury bills.
JUNE/JULY 1102
In order to see this point, consider the following simple model of the market for reserves. Reserves are supplied by the Federal Reserve either through open market operations or at the discount window. NER are determined solely by Federal Reserve actions and are independent of market interest rates. In contrast, BR are relatedto interest rates via equation 3. Depository institutions' demand for reserves is composed of their demand for required reserves (as determined by their deposit levels) and their demand tbr excess reserves. Under a system of contemporaneous reserve accounting (CRA), both required reserves and excess reserves are assumed to be negatively related to the rate on reserve adjustment assets. 13 This equilibrium is illustrated in figure 2a by the intersection of R 5 and Rä.
Under a system of LRA, current required reserves are determined by depository institutions' deposits of the prior two weeks. The demand for current required reserves is completely insensitive to the interest rates on reserve adjustment assets. The interest responsiveness of the demand for reserves is determined solely by the demand for excess reserves. Thus, demand for reserves under LIlA is less interest-sensitive (steeper), as illustrated by RJ in figure 2b."
The impact of a change in the discount rateunder CRA and LIlA is illustrated in figure 2. An increase in the discount rate reduces the amount of reserves supplied at each market rate, shifting the reserve supply curve to R. Given that the demand for 
6
' 3 Under CRA, depository institutions must weigh the marginal costs of having to adjust their reserve position either at the discount window or in the market with the marginal gain from making additional loans and investment and, thereby, creating additional deposits. Thus, when either the discount rate or the rates on alternative adjustment assets increase relative to depository institutions' lending rates, they respond by curtailing their lending and investment activities, which reduces their deposit liabilities and theirdemand for required reserves. Thus, the demand for required reserves would be interestsensitive under CRA. tinder LRA, the demand for required reserves Is detennined by deposit levels two weeks previous and, hence, is independent of current interest rates.
Excess reserves are thought to be held as a soutte of liquidity for the depository institution. As such, the opportuntly cost of holding excess reserves is income forgone by not investing them in some income-generating asset, like federal funds Thus, the demand for excess reserves is thought to be responsive to changes In market interest rates. The demand for excess reserves, however, Is generally not thought to be responsive to Interest rates. "The equilibrium market rate Is shown the same for both CM and LRA for ease of illustration. This accommodation to convenience dues not affect the conclusions.
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Figure 2
The Effect of Discount Rate Change Urder Contemporaneous and tagged Reserve Accounting
to reserves is less interest-sensitive under LRA, interest rates must rise by more in order to restore market equilibrium. Thus, a change in the discount rate will result in a larger change in the interest rates on reserve adjustment assets, and a smaller change in aggregate borrowing, the monetary base and the money supply.
J~/)( Effret on Other MorO't Rates
A change in the discount rate has its initial effect on the market interest rate of reserve adjustment assets. The extent to which a change in the market rates of these assets spills over to other market interest rates depends on the substitutability of assets in the portfolios of financial intermediaries and the public. To illustrate this point, assume for simplicity that depository institutions use only one asset as an alternative to borrowing from the Federal Reserve, and that this asset is not held in the portfolios of the rest of the private sector of the economy (e.g., federal hinds). Thus, there are no close substitutes for this asset in the portfolios of nondepositorv institutions.
In this case, the initial impact of a change in the discount rate would he reflected primarily in the market rate of this asset. The effect on other market interest rates would materialize only as depository institutions modified their lending and investment activities in light of the higher marginal cost of reserve adjustment hinds.
tT'ie.~Li/eel) ant Jiatr. linti the bemana f~orLmd.i
The discount rate also affects market interest rates via the demand for credit through the so-called announcement effect. According to this view, the business and financial communities regard discount rate changes as signals of the future direction of monetary policy. I)iscount rate changes are thus said to alter expectations about the future of business profits and the direction of interest rates.
linfbrtunatelv. the impact of the announcement effect depends 01) the exact nature of these expectation effects,'°To illustrate this, consider the following: If the Federal Reserve increased the discount rate, individuals might interpret this action as an indication that a slower rate of monetary growth, a lower rate of inflation and, hence, lower interest rates will soon follow. If this were the case, they might reduce their current demand for credit in anticipation of lower future interest rates. The demand for credit would shift to the left and, ceteris paribus, current interest rates would fall. The combined effects of a dliscount rate increase on the supply of and the demand fbr credit in this instance, under nonborrowed reserve targeting, are illustrated in figure  3 a. An increase in the discount rate shifts both the supply-of-credit and the demand-for-credit schedules to the left. Market interest rates would rise or fall depending on whether the shift in the demand curve is small or large, relative to the shift in the supply curve.
Conversely, individuals might interpret the discount rate increase asan indication that market interest rates will temporarily rise. In this case, the current demand for credit would increase. Under these circumstances, an increase in the discount rate would shift the supply' of credlit to the left arid the ciemanci for credit to the right as illustrated in figure :31). Market interest rates would then have risen in response td) a discount rate change.1 8 rrc' n Sot ith has ct slitmc'],ted that, rather Hiatt cli altgit tg the ci emanci for erecl it itt th c' s ho it run, a ci iscoo tIt rate itIc rca sc' may I oere lv in (It tee inarkc't patti ci pa its to sIti ft to cI ifie rc'nt tc' ml as sets in re spt atse to c' xpectati on s of Itigl te r or lower ftttti cc interest raft's, If this were the ease, the yield curve~vonld slsilh witlt changes in the chscottnt rate, See Smith, ''The I)iseouttt Rate as a C rc'clit Control Weapon.'' It should he noted, however, that there are those who questiol) whether there should be any significant expectational efhact associated with a discotmt rate change. They argue that a discount rate change is only one of a myriad of signals that individuals receive concerning the direction of economic actiyits' and interest rates; therefbre, it is doubtful that changes in the diiscOunt rate alone have any significant impact 01) the demand for credit.
Furthermore, it has been noted that changes in the discount rate are sometimes merely' technical adljrls'ttlients, designed to bring the discount rate in I inc with changes in market interest rates. Thus, if discount rate ch;nlges are coannonly' interpreted as signals of policy' change, they may be misinterpreted. It has even been suggested that, given the Federal Reserve Banks' tendency' to make these technical adjustments, a failure to change the ciiscount rate when market rates are changing could be construed as a change in Federal Reserve policy.17 "For a reed'at in e flretatioi t of cli set)u ut rate c'h at Iges rate range has been much wider since October 6, and the federal funds rate has exhibited more dayto-day variability. Moreover, the average daily spread between this rate and the discount rate has been much wider." Establishing the precise relationship between the discount rate and market interest rates is extremely difficult. Ideally, sets of equations representing the demand for credit, the supply of credit and a market-clearing condition should be specified. In this way, one could not only estimate the extent of the impact of a discount rate change on various market interest rates, but also identify the most significant source of the change (i.e., its effect through the supplyof orthe demandforcredit). 2°I n practice, however, this is difficult. As a result, the impact of a discount rate change on market interest rates is usually estimated with a reduced-form model, which "For a discussion of the relationship between the federal funds rate and the FOMC's announced federal funds rate range, see Lang, "The FOMC in 1979: Introducing Reserve Targeting"; and Gilbert and Trebing, "The FOMC in 1980: A Year of Reserve Targeting." 2 0ne possible way to identify a separate announcement effect is to specify a general model ofthe supply of and the demand for money. This could be done by simply including the discount rate as a separate variable in the demand for money and supply of money functions, and testing to see whether it has a significant effect on either or both. However, the conespondence between the discount rate and market interest rates, due to the fact that discount rate changes tend to follow market interest rate changes, biases this test toward the rejection of the announcement effect unless one has precise knowledge of the Federal Reserve's discountrate reaction function.Thisproblem could be overcome by simply estimating a reduced-form, equilibrium money stock equation. This equation would have the money stock a function of the exogenous variables ofthe system: aggregate income, the monetary base and the discount rate. A significant discount rate effect would be clear evidence of an announcement effect, since the impact of a discount rate change onthe money supply would be incorporated in the base. Unfortunately, an insignificant discount rate will not necessarily imply the absence of an announcement effect; this result could also be obtained ifthe money supply is relatively interest-inelastlc.Thus, one would have to show both that the money supply schedule is Interest-elastic and an insignificant discount rate in such a reduced-farm equation to argue convincingly that there is no announcement effect. Regretably, practical problems make this virtually impossible.
It is possible to show that the discount rate Is Insignificant in a reduced-form equation, employing seasonally adjusted data, for the 10/1979 -10/1981 period. The money supply equation exhibits some interest elasticity, however, only if seasonally nnadja.sted data is used. Because personal income (the only available monthly income series) is available only on a seasonally adjusted basis, It is Impossible to estimate the reducedform equation using seasonally unadjusted data. Thus, the Insignificant discount rate variable In the seasonally adjusted, reduced-form equation is not conclusive evidence against an announcement effect.
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The Discount Rate and Market Rates
To determine the effect of discount rate changes on market interest rates, the following equation was estimated using both the federal funds and the 3-month Treasury bills to represent alternative adjustment assets: 10 (4rAi,,t=8 0 + I 8AiM.j÷8~ADRt+ct j~1
This equation was estimated using daily data for the period from January 10, 1978, to April 13, 1982, and for subperiods of federal hinds rate targeting and NBR targeting.~The 10-day distributed lag of the market rate was included to capture the effect of other factors on the market rate before the discount rate change. Table 1 Also, a discount rate surcharge variable, ASC, was included in some of the regressions in the NBR targeting period to capture any effect of the Federal Reserve's surcharge on large, frequent borrowers. 25
The results for the entire period indicate that a discount rate change has a significant positive effrct on both the federal hinds and the Treasury bill rates. When the equation is estimated for subperiods of federal funds rate and NBR targeting, however, the results change. The coefficient on ADR is not significantly different from zero for the Treasury bill rate during the periodof federalhinds rate targeting. In contrast, the coefficient on ADR is significant for both market rates during the period of NBR targeting. Furthermore, the coefficient estimates on aDR are larger during the latter period.
The preceding section noted that discount rate changes would not affect market interest rates if the Federal Reserve targeted on them, but would afl~ct market rates under NBR targeting. The results for the Treasury bill rate equation correspond with this analysis, but the results from the federal funds rate equation do not. If depository institutions primarily rely on the federal hinds market to adjust their reserve positions, however, it is conceivable that most of the impact of a discount rate change could be absorbed by the federal hinds rate with virtually no spillover to other market rates. This even seems likely when one recognizes that the Federal Reserve has never followed a policy of rigidly pegging the level of the federal funds rate.
In addition, discount rate changes generally were made in order to keep the rate spread between the discount rate and the federal funds rate in a fairly narrow band during the funds rate targeting period." Thus, during this period, discount rate changes may have been anticipated and hilly reflected in market rates before the discount rate change. The Federal Reserve allowed the spread between the discount and the federal hinds rates to be much larger and variable during the NBR target- 
he Effects of the Surcharge
The effects of the discount rate surcharge on market interest rates during the NBR targeting period are mixed. When the discount rate surcharge variable is added to the federal funds rate equation, the coefficients on the discount rate variables become smaller. Furthermore, the coefficients on the surcharge variables are statistically significant, These results indicate a significant positive surcharge effect on the federal funds rate. In addition, they indicate thatthe estimates of the discount rate ef1~ct alone are unduly large when the surcharge variable is ignored. This is likely because of the interaction of discount rate and surcharge effectsP When the surcharge variable is included in the Treasury bill rate equation, the coefficients on the discount rate variables are essentially unaffected. The coefficients on the ASC variable are insignificant and small. Thus, it appears that the surcharge has no appreciable impact on the Treasury bill rate.
The Level3 of the Discount Bate and
Market Rates
The fact thatdiscount rate changes have a significant immediate effect on market interest rates does not mean that there is a significant relationship between the level of the discount rates and the level ofmarket rates. One would anticipate thatany effect of a discount rate change on market interest rates 2 VFbe results presented in this section appear to be robust. They are essentially unchanged if the equation is estimated in level foam, although the'Ats are much larger. Also, essentially the same results are obtained by astatistical comparison ofthe oneday percentage changes in the market rates on the day the discount rate change became effective with the 10-day and 20-day growth rates prior to the discount rate change. 1t is important to include the surcharge variable in the latter period because some of the changes in the discount rate and the surcharge overlap. The overlapping dates ue~November 17, 1980, December5, 1980, and May5,1981. Failure to include the surcharge could result in a spurious estimate of the discount rate effect. would be reflected in market rates ratherquickly, so that movement in these rates between discount rate changes would be dominated by other factors. 3°T his is borne out in a casual observation of the relationship between the discount rate and market rates over this period as shown in chart 1.
It is clear from this chart that market interest rates varied from levels substantially above the discount rate to levels substantially below it over this period. This merely reflects the previously noted fact that there is no level of market interest rates that necessarily corresponds to a given level of the discount rate.
Furthennore, thete were at least three occasions when discount rate changes were closely followed by movements in the 3-month Treasury bill rate in the opposite direction (June 13, 1980, December 5, 1980, and May 5, 1981). In the last instance, the federal funds rate and the Treasury bill rates moved in opposite directions. The federal funds rate rose from early May to mid-July 1981, then declined. In contrast, the bill rate fell from early May to early July, then rose until late August. Thus, it is difficult to find any consistent longer-term relationship between the level of the discount rateand the level of market interest rates.
CONCLUSIONS
Market interest rates are influenced by numerous factors that affect the supply of and demand for credit. One ofthese factors is the discount rate. The impact of the discount rate on market rates varies with the Federal Reserve's operating procedures. If the Federal Reserve is controlling interest rates, the monetary base or total reserves, changes in the discount rate have no effect on interest rates independent of the general tenor of monetary policy; the Federal Reserve simply would offset the effect of discount rate changes through open market operations. If the Federal Reserve is targeting on nonborrowed reserves, changes in the discount rateare more likely to have an impact on market rates, espe-. cially under lagged reserve accounting.
"In an effort to uncover a possible lagged response of the federal funds rate to discount rate changes, equatIon 4 was estimated with a 20-day distributed lag ofthe ADR variable. None of the Jagged s~uiables, however, was significant except for the seventh day. It is Interestingto note that, since most of the discount rate changes became effective on a Monday, the seventh-day lag would be Wednesday. the close ofthe "reserve week." This result, however, Is perhaps too tentative to assign any significance to it.
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Data indicate that e/wnges in the discount rate have produced a significant. albeit varied, immediate impact on both the federal hinds rate and the 3-month Treasury bill rate since January 1978. The e fleet of a clisconn t rate change on the federal hinds rate was significant for periods of hoth kderal funds rate targeting and nonborrowed reserve targeting. Discount rate changes significantly affected the Treasury bill rate, however, only in the period of nonhorrowed reserve targeting. Furthermore, changes in the discount rate that were macIc for purely technical reasons had no effect on either market interest rate, while changes in the Federal
Reserves surcharge on large, freqnent borrowers during the nonhorrowed reserve targeting period had a significant effect only on the federal funds rate.
There is virtually no evidence, however, that discount rate chan ges have bad a significant, independlen t effoct on market rates in the longer run. Therefore, while changes in the discount rate do produce changes in market interest rates in the short run, they do not appear to be the most significant factor affdcting the level of market interest rates in the longer run. 
